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by Gilbert Ryle 
We are not often enough or deeply enough puzzled by the notions of think- 
ing, pondering, rejecting, etc.; namely of what Rodin's Le  Penseur looks as 
if he is absorbed in. I am not concerned with the dreary notion of think- 
ing=believing, which anyhow has been sadly overworked, usually in the 
wrong harness. 
What is Le  Penseur doing, seemingly in his Cartesian insides? Or, to sound 
scientific, what are the mental processes like, which are going on in that 
Cartesian camera obscura? We are, since we have to be, absolutely familiar 
with the thing, that is, with the cogitative doing or the process of pondering 
itself, for it has been, at least off and on, since our infancy part of the pulse 
of our own existence. Cogitamus ergo Sumus. Yet we cannot, apparently, 
answer the simplest concrete questions about it. Why can't we? How could 
it, of all things, be hidden from us? 
Notoriously some of our ponderings, but not all, terminate in the solutions 
of our problems; we had been fogged, but at last we came out into the clear. 
But if sometimes successful, why not always? If belatedly, why not promptly? 
Ifwith difficulty, why not easily? Why indeed does it ever work? How possibly 
can it work? Notoriously, too, some people are better thinkers than others; 
and we ourselves may be better at thinking out the solutions of anagrams 
than at thinking out the solutions of chess-problems. Whence these dispari- 
ties? What sort of an unevenly distributed craft or skill is this? Why did I 
acquire my own personal ration of it, and not yours instead? Why does not 
Mozart, indeed why cannot he, suddenly start thinking Immanuel Kant's 
thoughts, and vice versa? Why do not schools provide classes in thinking, 
as they do in mundane crafts like drawing, Latin, carpentry, and rifle-shoot- 
ing? Ridiculous suggestion? Certainly. But then what makes it ridiculous to 
suggest that thinking is one teachable skill among others? Surely not anything 
like what would make it ridiculous to suggest that the natural processes of 
digesting and perspiring are extra skills that could and should be taught in 
schools or universities. 
Let us pause a bit with this little riddle. Why would it be absurd for a school 
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or university to offer a separate course of instruction in thinking? There are 
two reasons, one important but dull; the other important and interesting. 
1) The housewife who has separate shelves, hooks, containers, and bags 
marked for flour, sugar, onions, mustard, etc., does not also have separate 
receptacles marked 'food,' 'edibles,' 'comestibles,' or 'victuaIs,' for the simple 
reason that she has already provided receptacles for all the species of these 
genera. Well, similarly, the school or college curriculum which promises 
courses in arithmetic, French grammar, Hittite archeology, verse composi- 
tion, etc., is already promising instruction in species of thinking. A student 
who has been taught some arithmetic or some French grammar has already 
learned in some measure to think out arithmetical problems or problems in 
composing or construing French prose. All learning is learning to tackle 
problems of this, that, or the other specific varieties. There are no residual 
problems of purely generic sorts. 
2) If the school or college promised to teach Originality, Invention, Wit, 
Pertinence, Initiative, Enterprise, Spontaneity,Talent, and Genius, we should 
feel sceptical. The lessons, exercises, tests, competitions, etc., might indeed 
and should equip and encourage the students to attempt moves of their own, 
to compose sonnets or plays of their own, to design experiments of their own, 
and so on. But these adventures, diminutive, modest, or striking, must be 
spontaneous, else they will not be essays, inventions, or compositions of the 
student's own. For it to be his failure or his success, his good shot or his poor 
shot, it has not to be something contributed by the teacher. If it is the student's 
own sonnet, then it is not the teacher's sonnet, for all that the student would 
never have composed it without the teacher's suggestions, criticisms, drills, 
etc. Now the notion of thinking is the notion of thinking for oneself, of making 
one's own try, however perfunctory and diffident, at some problem, task, or 
difficulty. His instructors will have equipped and perhaps encouraged him 
to make his shot; but the shot is his and not his instructors'. My initiatives, 
small or great, unsuccessful or successful, cannot, in logic, be what my teachers 
or my textbook did for me. 
To keep our restricted deck-space fairly clear for the present I am going 
to leave on one side such off-center things as the thinking of the man who 
is glumly brooding over an insult; the thinking of a man who is, for pleasure, 
running over in his head a tune or a poem that he has long since got by heart; 
and the thinking of the man who is just daydreaming. We shall be concen- 
trating on the man who is trying to think something out, whose thinking, 
unlike that of those others, can be successful or unsuccessful, bright or dull, 
industrious or idle, expert or amateurish, laborious or easy. 
I am going to approach my objective by a knight's move, one which I think 
may surprise you a bit. For I am going to begin by reminding you of some 
truisms about teaching and therefore, necessarily, also about learning. Why? 
Because, to put it infantilely, my hope is to define thinking indirectly in terms 
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of teaching. I am going to argue that Le Penseur is not, of course, engaged 
in privily teaching himself whatever it is that he wants to know-he cannot 
teach it because he does not know it-but that he is experimentally plying 
himself with might-be cues, clues, reminders, snubs, exercises, spurs, etc., of 
types that are sometimes or often employed unexperimentally by teachers 
who are teaching what they do know. But we have some ground to cover 
first. Anyhow from the outset it seems plausible to say that Le Penseur could 
always have been saved from his present labours of pondering by getting 
someone else-the Angel Gabriel, say-to teach him the answer. So there is 
this connection between thinking and teaching. Thinking is trying to make 
up for a gap in one's education. 
I am going to assume, what has been argued elsewhere, that, with a reserva- 
tion or two, all teaching is teaching-to and all learning is learning-to. Even 
the memorizing of rhymes, dates, tunes, etc., qualifies as learning just in so 
far as it leads to more than mechanicaI echoing. The child has not begun 
to learn to spell who can only recite, parrot-like, the dictated spellings 'C-A-T' 
CAT, and 'B-0-B' BOB. Only when he has begun to try to think up the right 
spellings or at least possible spellings for words to which he has not been 
alphabetically introduced, has he begun to learn to spell. To have learned 
to solve anagrams is to have learned to solve new anagrams, not to play back 
the solutions of anagrams already solved by the instructor. I am going to lean 
heavily later on these notions of teaching-to and being taught-to. But I warn 
you that here I am flying in the faces of most N.C.O.'s and of too many 
educationalists, who never doubt that teaching consists in dictating things 
for subsequent verbatim regurgitation. Naturally, though horrifyingly, some 
of them think well of the potential teaching-utility of subliminal gramo- 
phones. Tape recorders play back, but they do not learn. People who do learn 
do not just play back. Even to have learned something by heart is to have 
become able to do more than to parrot the piece. It is to be able to detect 
and correct erroneous recitations, to recite the piece and not some other piece 
when required to do so; to be able to deliver it fast or slowly, to start it or 
stop it at required places and so on. 
Partly for ulterior reasons, but partly to dispel your attachment, if it exists, 
to this superstition that learners are mere players-back, I now remind you 
of a few of the teaching-methods, devices, and dodges by which ordinarily 
good or very good teachers do actually teach things to us. 
1. They tell us lots of things, of course, but with variations in vocabulary, 
context, emphasis, etc., sometimes viva voce and sometimes in writing; with 
or without new illustrations, expansions, elucidations, corollaries, etc. They 
do not repeat themselves like cuckoo-clocks, or not much-and for obviously 
good pedagogic reasons. 
2. They test us, hardly at all for our ability to parrot their actual words 
or to ape their actual movements, but for our ability and readiness to exploit 
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the lesson itself by applying it, re-phrasing it, accelerating it, drawing conclu- 
sions from it, marrying it with earlier lessons, etc., etc.; in short, by doing 
things on our own with it. 
3. They teach us cricket-strokes, perspective-drawing and French pronun- 
ciation, not much by describing anything, but by showing us how the thing 
should and also how it should not be done, and then getting us to move or 
utter, and not to move or utter in similar ways. 
4. They tease us, like Socrates, with questions, and then with further ques- 
tions about our answers, and it is we who do the answering. 
5 .  They make us practice and re-practice our five-finger exercises and our 
conversions of syllogisms, with variations in tempo, syllogism-topic, etc. 
6. They lead us by the hand along a half-familiar track and leave us in 
the lurch to get ourselves over its final stretch. 
7. They cite or exhibit blatantly erroneous or inadequate solutions, for us, 
in recoil, to improve on them and/or to pinpoint what was wrong in them; 
and they caricature our own sillier attempts in order to get us to ridicule them 
for ourselves. 
8. They draw our attention to partly analogous, but easier problems, and 
leave us to use these analogies as banisters. 
9. They break up complex problems into simpler ingredients and leave us 
to solve these unalarming ingredient problems, and then to reunite their 
solutions. 
10. When we have hit on the (or a) solution, they set us subsidiary or 
parallel problems in order to get us to consolidate and limber up our mastery 
of the original solution. 
All of these and scores or hundreds of similar didactic moves, expedients, 
tactics, and dodges are intended by our teachers to get us ourselves to do 
and to say things of our own (as well as very often to undo and unsay things); 
for example, not just to parrot the recited spellings of a few given words but 
to attempt the spellings of hitherto unattempted words on the lines of those 
dictated specimens, and to withdraw or improve our first attempts. 
Naturally and notoriously the pupil often fails to respond, or to respond 
well. He is, perhaps, scared, bored, sulky, stupid, restless, unambitious, or 
hostile, and the teacher is, perhaps, tired, shy, in a hurry, cross, pessimistic, 
and off his preferred subject. Conversely, the fact that the pupil has shown 
no sign of progress yesterday or today is quite compatible with his coming 
on fast next week or next term. Seeds often do germinate slowly. Muscles 
always are slow to harden up. Did you succeed in swimming in your first 
lesson? If not, had you learned nothing at  all in that first lesson? I mention 
these truisms because Le Penseur's own ponderings (which is what we are 
a11 along concerned with) can be in just the same plight. He too flogs away 
and makes no headway today; tomorrow he too seems to be in a worse mud- 
dle than ever; yet sometimes, though not always, for him too things will have 
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sorted themselves out rather well after the weekend. Dividends often do 
arrive rather a long time after the investments are made. Thus the progress 
made or not made or not visibly made by L e  Penseur resembles in several 
ways the progress made or not made or not visibly made by the teacher-pupil 
pair. Our question, "Why does thinking not always work, or not always 
quickly?' is in parallel with the same less puzzling questions about teaching. 
None the less, whatever their other similarities, Le Penseur is not himself, 
so to speak, a Siamese teacher-pupil pair. For the teacher knows the things 
that he tries to teach to his pupil; L e  Penseur is pondering just because he 
does not know what he wants to know. My thinking is not the instruction 
of pupil Gilbert by teacher Ryle. Gilbert Ryle, in his thinking, is trying to 
find out what no one, external or internal, is there to teach him. To ponder 
is to try to make up for un-instruction. What I am trying to think out for 
myself is indeed something that the Angel Gabriel conceivably might have 
known and taught me instead, but it is something that no one in fact did 
teach me. That is why I have to think. I swim because I am not a passenger 
on someone else's ferry-boat. I think, as I swim, for myself. No one else could 
do this for me. 
Now I make a start on the second leg of my knight's move, namely to bring 
out a connection, not an identity, between being taught and thinking. 
I have already declared that the pupil does not qualify as having even 
begun to learn to spell or solve anagrams so long as all he is ready and able 
to do is to play back the dictated spellings of a few selected specimen words 
or the dictated solutions of a few specimen anagrams. Only when he begins 
to suggest possible spellings of his own for new words, or possible solutions 
of his own for new anagrams and to reject some such suggestions, does he 
qualify. Ditto for learning rock-climbing, chess, and philosophy. His blank 
repetition of what the teacher said or exhibited is not yet what the teacher 
was trying to get him to do. But notice now: when the pupil does make his 
own applications and misapplications in new tasks of what his teacher has 
told or exhibited, then he certainly qualifies as thinking. For he is now apply- 
ing off his own bat a recently learned operation-pattern to a new object or 
situation; he is today innovating according to a formerly set precedent; he 
is today chancing his arm subject to some previously inculcated safeguards. 
His frequent mistakes and failures are now his doing; his occasional successes 
are now his doing. It is he and not his teacher who now merits praise or blame 
for getting things right or wrong. 
Here we are confronted by a seeming paradox. For we seem to be saying 
that in spelling or misspelling a new word, or in solving a new anagram, or 
in composing his own limerick or sonnet, the pupil is doing something on 
his own, which, therefore, he had not been taught. If it is his own sonnet 
or limerick, or his own anagram-solution, or his own spelling or misspelling 
of the word "rabbit," then that could not have been something that his teacher 
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had taught him. Conversely, if that sonnet, that anagram-solution, or that 
spelling of "rabbit" had been taught by the teacher, then it was not the pupil 
who thought it up, but the teacher-or his teacher. However, the appearance 
of a paradox vanishes when we remember that having learned, say, to spell 
does not reduce to having become the passive recipient and subsequent auto- 
matic regurgitator of some dictated letter-sequences. It is to have become 
able and ready to attempt new applications of acquired patterns, methods, 
precedents, examples, etc. The young rock-climber is first learning to climb 
when he ceases to tread where his teacher trod and begins to try to tread over 
new slopes in the ways in which his teacher treads. 
I am not changing the subject when I now invite you to consider (A) what 
Socrates and the slave boy do in Plato's dialogue, the Meno; and (B) what 
they do in my sequel to that dialogue. 
(A) Socrates asks the geometrically innocent slave boy how he would con- 
struct a square precisely double the area of a given square. In the end the 
boy comes out with the right answer, namely that the square on the diagonal 
of the original square is of twice the area of that square itself. But Socrates 
elicits this correct Pythagorean answer without tellingthe boy any geometrical 
truths, however simple. He merely asks him questions, and then by further 
questions gets him to abandon his first tempting answers. We need, for our 
purpose, to note a few points about this piece of interrogative pedagogics 
or tutorial cross-questioning. 
(1) Though this point is not emphasized, the boy is already equipped with 
a modicum of elementary arithmetic and, of course, with colloquial Attic 
Greek. 
(2) Unaided Socratic cross-questioning could not possibly have made simi- 
lar progress or any progress at all towards the solution of factual questions 
about, say, the casualties at Marathon or the date of the next eclipse of the 
sun. Nor could Le Penseur's unaided ponderings. 
(3) Though Socrates draws his famous moral that the boy must in a pre- 
vious existence have got to know that Pythagorean theorem for it to be able 
to be elicited from him now by mere questioning, we, surely like all the 
disputatious young men in the Academy who were any good, flatly reject 
this moral  on the obvious ground tha t  if, without still ulterior 
memory-flogging, the boy had been able in that supposed previous existence 
to discover the Pythagorean theorem by thinking, then there is nothing to 
prevent the boy from discovering it by thinking today. How was it originally 
discovered? Some solutions to some problems are attainable by pondering; 
all the more so when the ponderer is cunningly and persistently barked at 
by a Socratic sheepdog who already knows the way. 
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(4) Although the boy has given to each question, one by one, first his 
ill-thought-out answers and finally the wanted well-thought-out answer, still 
he does not claim to have thought out the whole proof for himself. After a 
fumble or two he had picked up each of the several links one by one, but 
it was Socrates who had controlled the chain, Already knowing the proof of 
P~thagoras' Theorem, Socrates, unlike the boy and also unlike Le Penseur, 
knew all along what questions were the right questions to ask and what was 
the right, or at least a suitable, sequence in which to ask them. 
(B) Now listen to my own fabrication, namely the story of Socrates' second 
interview with the boy. Socrates begins again by putting a theorem-sized 
question to the boy; and he starts off as before by posing appropriate ques- 
tions and demolishing the boy's initial answers to them. But now-oh hor- 
ror!-Socrates realizes that he himself has either quite forgotten or, even 
worse, never had mastered the second half of this second theorem's proof. 
He has no idea how to go on; and, as Euclid's Elements has not been published 
yet, he cannot even surreptitiously consult that will-be standard work. What 
is to be done? He frankly confesses the crisis to the boy, who, to start with, 
sees no difficulty. He says, "But yesterday, Socrates, you did not tell me any 
of the answers; you only asked me questions, to which I myself after some 
false starts gave you the right answers. Why can't we do that again? You 
don't need to know their answers in order to ask questions." 
Socrates explains that randomly thrown out questions cannot be 
expected to assemble themselves into a proof-generating sequence, but he 
concedes that with huge luck they might do so; and he concedes that he, 
Socrates, has had enough teaching experience in general, and has enough 
geometrical knowledge in particular to avoid asking lunatic, irrelevant, or 
infantile questions and to see through grossly silly answers. He cannot, as 
yesterday, pilot the slave boy, since today he does not know the channels. 
But he can make and coordinate some conjectural pilot-like suggestions and 
experiments, and he can now and then spot where rocks and shoals might 
be before getting to them. He is at home on salt water in general, though 
not on this particular stretch of it. 
So Socrates starts off, pessimistically enough, trying out a question that 
occurs to him and then another and another; and by lunchtime all the pro- 
gress they have made is the negative discovery that most of these particular 
questions had better not be asked again; though one or two short question- 
sequences had felt a bit promising. And that, very likely, is all the progress 
that they do  make. But it could be that on the next day Socrates and the 
boy are getting an idea of some of the deeps and shallows, some of the head- 
lands and islands. Even if steering directly towards their unseen goal is stiIl 
impossible, steering away from some specific troubles is becoming fairly easy. 
Perhaps eventually Socrates' initially chartless quasi-piloting fetches them 
nearly or even exactly where they want to be. Explorers always do have to 
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start off chartless; yet, as we know, some of them sometimes with luck, flair, 
patience, and an already trained eye for country, end up with a bit of what 
had been no-man's-land now properly charted. 
Now for my moral. This joint plight of the slave boy and my Socrates who 
on this occasion had not done his geometrical homework is precisely the 
plight that Pythagoras himself had been in during the hours or weeks when 
he was still trying to discover a proof of his own dear Pythagoras' Theorem. 
For hours or weeks Pythagoras had been his own slave boy being plied by 
his own unprepared Socratic self with hesitantly mooted candidate-questions 
nearly, though not quite, randomly hit on, and tentatively posed in nearly, 
but not quite, random sequences. By thinking he eventually solved his prob- 
lem without once during the entire course of his ponderings being yet 
equipped to teach himself or anyone else its solution. He had not, and no 
one had, done his homework. It was not yet there to do, as it has been there 
ever since. 
Unlike the guide who leads his docile companions along paths that already 
exist and are already familiar to him, though not to them, the pioneering 
pathfinder, Pythagoras say, has no tracks to follow; and any particular 
sequence ofpaces that he tentatively takes through the jungle may soon have 
to be marked by him as leading only into swamps or thickets. All the same, 
it may be, though it need not be, that in a day's time or a year's time he 
will have made a track along which he can now guide docile companions 
safely and easily right through the jungle. How does he achieve this? Not 
by following tracks, since there are none to follow. Not by sitting down and 
wringing his hands. But by walking over ground where tracks certainly do 
not exist, but where, with luck, assiduity, and judgment, tracks might and 
so perhaps will exist. All his walkings are experimental walkings on hypo- 
thetical tracks or candidate-tracks or could-be tracks, or tracks on appro; and 
it is by so walking that, in the end, while of course he finds lots and lots of 
impasses, he also finds (if he does find) a viable track. 
Pythagoras or, in general, Le Penseur is also in just this same unencourag- 
ing position. Tracks are found by the pioneer (if they are found), only by 
quasi-following could-be tracks, that is, by his experimentally trying out on 
appro one bit of ground after another to see if they could henceforth be 
unanxiously trodden by docile travelers who are not exploring. 
There is my moral, Let me stiffen it with two cautionary remarks: 
(1) To repeat: Pythagoras in trying to think out the proof of his theorem 
is not teaching himself this proof, since he has not yet found it. Nor is my 
Socrates teaching the boy the thing that he has omitted to prepare himself 
with. 
(2) Pythagoras, my Socrates or, to generalize, Le Penseur, is tentatively, 
experimentally, suspiciously, and quite likely despondently trying out on 
himself expedients, routines, procedures, exercises, curbs, and dodges of types 
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which teachers do employ, not always successfully, when they want to teach 
things that they know to pupils who do not. He is trying thein out on himself 
to see if they will be effective, which very often they will not be, They are 
not already established leads to his goal, but only could-be leads or can- 
didate-clues or potential cues, like the As-If tutorial questions unconfidently 
put to the slave boy by my geometrically unprepared Socrates. 
To say that Le Penseur is experimentally subjecting himself to on appro 
tutorial questions, clues, deterrents, exercises, etc., is not to say merely that 
he is being histrionic. He need not be, though he may be, aping his old head- 
master or his former geometry tutor. The expert moves that you make in 
~limbing the cliff-face may be imitated by a mere mimic; but the patterns 
of them may also be applied experimentally by the young climber who is 
trying out ways of scrambling upwards on such cliff-faces. He is deliberately 
trying to climb cliffs after the ways in which you climb them. He is not aping 
you but learning to do things of sorts that you have long since learned to 
do. He is following your examples, not trying to simulate your motions. His 
success, if he does succeed, is a bit of scaling, not a bit of representing. 
Naturally my Penseur knows what it is like to be taught things that he does 
not know by teachers who do; and he knows what it is or would be like himself 
to be the teacher of some things that he knows to others who do not. So now 
he experimentally applies to himself, just in case they may turn out to be 
effective, operations of types that are often or sometimes employed effectively 
by live teachers upon live pupils. He chalks upon the back of an envelope 
a diagram, which he does not know to be even an approximation to the right 
one, in the rather faint hope that it may get him to see something that he 
needs to see, in the way in which the right diagram on the classroom black- 
board often but not always does get the students to see what they need to 
see. Or he suspiciously concocts for his still unfledged argument a candidate- 
premise just to see whether it will work, or can be modified into working, 
as a premise in his argument. It  is not yet a premise. It is a premise on appro. 
He is not basing anything on it; he is only As-If basing something on it. He 
is not just theatrically staging the moves of an arguer; and he is not just 
playing at arguing; he is working, working experimentally with a merely 
could-be argument-step. This is what an hypothesis is, a could-be premise 
on appro. 
We began with some vexatious teasers about thinking, like "if it is an art, 
craft, or skill, how do we acquire it, and why do schools not give special 
instruction in it? Why does it not always work? How does it ever work?" Now 
we can see, just one rung lower down on the sophistication-ladder, that the 
same questions, though still vexatious, are not quite as vexatious when asked 
about teaching. Is teaching one art, craft, or skill among others? Could uni- 
versities teach it? What would they be teaching you in just teaching you to 
teach (period)? 
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No, teaching, like thinking, is after all not just one art or skill among others, 
any more than cooking is one soufflC among others. Yet it remains true, 
though I think unimportantly true, that there do exist instructional dodges, 
expedients, etc., varying with different pupils and with different kinds of 
lessons, without which a good golfer may be a poor golf coach; or without 
which a new Comprehensive SchooI teacher of French may cope less effec- 
tively with her unruly charges than does her colleague whose French is much 
weaker. I suppose it is such crafts that Colleges of Education do teach. For 
"education" is not itself the name of one teachable craft among others. 
"Learning to teach . . ." is an unfinished phrase, because "teaching. . ." is 
unfinished. 
My concluding point is this. Plato said that in thinking the soul is conver- 
sing with herself; or maybe "debating" would be nearer the Greek. J. B. 
Watson said that thinking is sub-saying; plenty of philosophers and psychol- 
ogists declare that all thinking is conducted in symbols, or in words and 
sentences, or in pictures or in diagrams or in formulae, etc. The metaphor 
of words or sentences being the vehicles of thought has still a vogue, and 
the idea that thought, like American golfers, is in need of vehicles seems to 
be quite generally swallowed. But what sorts of generalizations about think- 
ing are these? Have amateur or professional introspections revealed this 
general dependence of thinking upon wording? But if that is all, might not 
Trobrianders think well enough without such vehicles? After all, we Euro- 
peans do eat with knives, forks, and spoons. Yet Trobrianders, maybe, eat 
without gastronomic vehicles. Or are these generalizations about thinking 
supposed to be conceptual necessities? Yet if so, just how does the description 
of someone as, after breakfast, pensafit, carry with it the information that 
during that time he was saying things to himself in his head or picturing things 
to himself in his mind's eye, etc.? 
We can now cope with this bother in two moves: 
(1) For person A to teach person B something, A must either say things 
to B, which B hears, takes in, etc.; or A writes things or draws things, which 
B reads, copies, takes in, etc.; or A demonstrates or shows things to B, which 
B sees or hears or tastes or smells, etc.; or A audibly jeers at B or visibly 
beckons or frowns to him, or noticeably pauses meaningfully; and so on and 
so on. A cannot teach B without communicating with him. Lessons have to 
be got across, often across a classroom. Lessons are a very special sub-species 
of interpersonal communications, namely of educatively intended communi- 
cations. Of course, the tuition of B by A requires vehicles. 
(2) So, in so far as Le Penseur is occupied in experimentally or on appro 
trying out on himself, as on his inner slave boy, things of the sorts that consti- 
tute the vehicles by which live teacher A conveys his lessons to live pupil 
B, he is necessarily operating, overtly or just in imagination, with and on such 
things as words, sentences, diagrams, signals, gestures, etc. He is not, as we 
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have seen, just mimicking real teachers; but he, just as much as the actor 
who is mimicking Socrates or Mr. Chips, has in logic to do the sorts of things 
that are done by Socrates and Mr. Chips in teaching their pupils. We might 
parody Plato and say that in thinking the soul is not just conversing or debat- 
ing with herself; she is experimentally conveying could-be lessons to herself. 
Sometimes she is quasi-Iecturing to herself; old-style German thinkers 
seemed to be doing this all the time. 
Cartesians love to depict the activity of the thinker as consisting of 
supremely immaterial ingredients, such impalpable ingredients as ideas, 
intuitions, insights, etc. In fact, the crude stuff of thinking has to consist of 
the perfectly ordinary vehicles of everyday interpersonal lesson-communica- 
tion, though here employed not in its normal didactic task, but in the parasitic 
or higher-order task of query-tuition. It does not matter whether Le Penseur 
actually draws his diagrams on paper, or visualizes them as so drawn; and 
it does not matter whether in his quasi-posing his on appro Socraticquestions 
to himself he speaks these aloud, mutters them under his breath, or only As-If 
mutters them on his mind's tongue. What matters is what he is trying to do, 
and is sometimes succeeding in doing, by thus overtly or covertly plying 
himself with these candidate-lesson-vehicles, for example, that he is trying 
to find, and is sometimes finding, the proofs of theorems. As A's well-charted 
teaching can occasionally dispel B's ignorance, so my uncharted thinlung can 
occasionally dispel my own ignorance. Thinking is trying to better one's 
instructions; it is trying out promissory tracks which will exist, if they ever 
do exist, only after one has stumbled exploringly over ground where they 
are not. 
